Legislative Control of Public Utilities in Wisconsin by Crow, William L.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 18
Issue 2 February 1934 Article 2
Legislative Control of Public Utilities in Wisconsin
William L. Crow
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
William L. Crow, Legislative Control of Public Utilities in Wisconsin, 18 Marq. L. Rev. 80 (1934).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol18/iss2/2
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES IN WISCONSIN
WILLIAm L. CROW
T HE implications involved in the problem of the regulation of pub-
lic utilities challenge the attention of every thinking individual,
and have large consequences for everyone whether he thinks or not.
No discussion of this problem can take place without bringing into
focus the battling forces of tattered laissez-faireism on the one side and
the neatly uniformed hosts of elaborate governmental control on the
other. Under the driving force of collectivism, what private business
today will find itself tomorrow clothed with a public interest? In this
battle array, shall we enroll on the side of controlled monopoly, or shall
we be found at times on the side of competition and duplication? Can
we intelligently appraise the significance of the human element in this
matter of regulation, put our faith in public service commissions, and
complacently assume that legislatures deftly know the difference be-
tween regulation and strangulation? Is it possible to discern a dividing
line near the middle of the twilight zone which separates high-wrought
control from state ownership? How far can government go in the pro-
tection of the public without surrendering the power and stimulus of
private enterprise? Experience illuminates the problem, and points in
the direction of an authoritative answer. Wisconsin is known as one of
the most progressive states in the American nation. What is this great
commonwealth doing with its public utilities?
I
Administrative, economic and ethical reasons prompted the enact-
ment of the Public Utilities Law of Wisconsin.
Wisconsin in 1907 was on the threshold of a great advance in the
control of her public utilities' by passing what has become generally
known as the Public Utilities Law.'
In the first place, from a governmental point of view, it was a sig-
nificant step to substitute administrative simplicity for existing confu-
sion in the granting of utility franchises. Justice Marshall has por-
trayed the situation existing before 1907 in an impressive way:
'A public utility as defined by the Wisconsin law embraces "every corporation,
company, individual, association, their lessees, trustees or receivers appointed
by any court, and every town, village or city that may own, operate, manage or
control any toll bridge or any plant or equipment or the conveyance of tele-
phone messages or for the production, transportation, delivery or furnishing
of heat, light, water or power directly or indirectly to or for the public."2 Chapter 499, Wis. Stats.
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"The confusion created during the years preceding the public utili-
ties law of 1907 by granting franchises in several different ways,--some
directly by the state, some by cities as state agencies, some by the state
in the main but with power to the various municipalities as state agen-
cies to add supplementary features, fitting particular situations, some
by the state without regard to local police regulations, and some like-
wise having such regard either expressly or by necessary implication,
some having contractual features creating doubt in regard to constitu-
tional status, and some having such features but without doubtful char-
acter, many of such matters being, in the ultimate, more or less detri-
mental to consumers whether public or private, and proprietors as well
-in the whole, created a perplexing situation in respect to harmonious
administration."3
Again, there was a legislative decision that as a general proposi-
tion the theory of public utility competition was wrong and that regu-
lated monopoly was right. Referring to the law of 1907, the supreme
court of Wisconsin stated: "One of the main purposes of the law was
to avoid duplication and it was thought that by efficiently controlling
the rates to be charged by a single utility the consumer would derive
the benefit resulting from economy in production."' 4 (Italics ours.)
Then, there were certain financial offenses which were more or less
the natural outgrowth of an unregulated, natural monopoly, the services
of which were in constantly increasing demand. Wealth was being con-
centrated in the hands of a relatively small number by taking advan-
tage of the unprotected consumers through the device of watering
stock,5 attended a little later with increase in rates6 to provide payment
on the additional capitalization.7 This financial power was not only an
end in itself, but was being used to dominate elections and to mould the
decisions of municipal officials."
Motivated by these purposes the legislature went about its work,
but in the business of setting up machinery of control and in defining
3 La Crosse v. La Crosse Gas and Electric Co., 145 Wis. 408, 420, 130 N.W. 530
(1911).
4 Wisconsin Traction, L. H. & P. Co. v. Menasha, 157 Wis. 1, 8, 145 N.W. 231
(1914).
5 "Down at the bottom of the public service corporation agitation is the watered
stock evil." Alderman J. B. Leedom, Milwaukee, quoted in The Milwaukee
Journal, July 12, 1906.
6 In the early states of regulation the question of rates seemed to be of greatest
importance in the minds of the people. For example, the Railroad Commission
was known as the "Railroad Rate Commission." See Lewis E. Gettle, "Tele-
phone Regulation from the Commission's Point of View," p. 3.
7There were complaints of large dividends, high rates, and poor service. See
The Milwaukee Journal, August 20, 1906.
8 "For many years the public service corporations throughout the country have
done more to control municipalities than the municipalities have done to con-
trol them . . . Money making has been the one aim of public service corpo-
rations .. . " Douglas J. Mangan, assembly candidate, quoted in The Milwau-
kee Journal, August 16, 1906.
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the rights of the public utilities under the new regime, there was an
exhibition of an admirable sense of justice. On the one side there was a
possibility that regulation might go too far. It had been pointed out that
"the whole question of regulation borders at all times on the danger-
ous," and that too much regulation might curb private initiative or
compel capital to leave the state.? On the other side, not enough regula-
tion might prove to be only an empty gesture, and there would be in
the face of all the legislation a practical continuation of the abuses.
There are evidences that the control in Wisconsin has been quite satis-
factory,10 although, as will be discussed later, 1 changing conditions
have brought about severe criticisms 12 and a modification of the earlier
law.
II
It was the legislative decision in 1907 that the fundamental purposes
of regulation could best be attained by state rather than by local control.
Two major philosophies of public utility control were represented
before the legislature of 1907,"3 the one incorporated in the Committee's
0 The Milwaukee Journal, July 13, 1906.
10 After five years of experience with the Wisconsin law, R .V. Johnson states
that the results have been "generally satisfactory to the public, the utilities,
and the investors in utility securities." "Workings of Wisconsin Commission,"
Public Service, April, 1912, p. 129.
Matthew S. Dudgeon said in 1914 that "both the public and public utilities seem
to agree that it is at once effective, just and practical." "Public Utility Legisla-
tion," Electric Railway Journal, 1914, p. 728, 731.
Seven years after the Wisconsin law had been in effect, John H. Roemer,
Chairman of the Railroad Commission, pointed out the experimental nature of
the regulation, and went on to say that the experience up to that time in the
various states could "furnish no conclusive warrant or assurance that the sys-
tem . . . will prove itself universally adaptable to existing political and eco-
nomic conditions in the various states." "Certain Salient Features of the Regu-
lation of Public Service Corporations by State Commissions," p. 1.
"See infra, p. 91.
12" . . . the so-called indeterminate franchise law, which was adopted in 1907
and has since been frequently amended, is probably the very worst type of
utility laws from the standpoint of the cities of the state and the very best for
the companies.
"Among other things this law proceeds upon the theory that in the electric
light and power field in every community there should be an absolute monop-
oly,-no competition should be permitted. Furthermore, under existing condi-
tions this absolute monopoly is essentially perpetual as well. The law provides
that cities may buy, but the state railroad commission is to fix the price, must
issue a certificate of 'necessity and convenience' and the cities are not always
in a position to meet the requirements." Carl D. Thompson, Secretary, Public
Ownership League, "Essentials of a Constructive Program for Public Power
Development in Wisconsin," The Municipality, July, 1928.
13 The Public Utilities Law was an extension of the control begun in 1905. In
that year the legislature created the Railroad Commission and passed the Rail-
road Rate Law. (Chapter 362.) This legislation was so well received and so
many qualities of leadership were displayed by the new commission that it
became easy to amend the law of 1905 and to extend the regulation. See John
R. Commons, "The Public Utilities Law," Review of Reviews, August 1907,
Vol. XXXVI.
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bill,1 4 which would put the entire control in a state commission, and
the other embodied in a substitute amendment, 5 which would put valu-
ation and uniform accounting in the hands of the state, but would leave
the important matter of rate regulation to local authorities.1 6
The principal arguments against the Committee's plan of centralized
control were that it was a recognition of the failure of local self-
government, the assumption being that municipal councils were either
incompetent or dishonest ;17 that it would favor the public utilities be-
cause of delays in administration; that it would result in smaller mat-
ters being ignored entirely; that with it the large utilities could easily
unite to dictate the appointment of members of the commission,"" and
that it was contrary to the tendencies of the times.19
The advantages of the Wisconsin scheme of state control over local
control were presented by the Railroad Commission" to the Legisla-
ture of 1925 in a very comprehensive way in preparation for a move
on the part of some to bring back local control. The reasons for cen-
tral or state control can be summarized as follows :21
1. Local control would be accompanied by a lack of necessary and
adequate information. Local bodies are in very many instances without
experts in accounting system and hence would not provide records de-
veloped along scientific lines. To illustrate, it might happen that cer-
tain local bodies might make no distinction between repairs and re-
placements, or confuse construction costs and those chargeable to oper-
14 581S and 933A.
1' No. 2S to 933A.
16 "The lack of . . . expert technical knowledge on the part of those who acted
for municipalities in establishing rates before the passage of the utility law
was one of the chief reasons which led the legislature to take the regulation of
rates out of the hands of municipal authorities and to vest that power in the
commission." Pabst Corporation v. Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 349, 356, 208 N.W. 493(1926).
17 "The committee's bill is drawn on the theory that the... common council can-
not be trusted. . . It is drawn on the theory that the municipal councils even
with . . . sources of information are incompetent and dishonest. The bill is
drawn on the theory that local self-government is a failure; it is an impeach-
ment of our form of government ... It is absurd to say that if the council has
impartial valuation of the property and an accurate account of every item of
expenditure and income and knows the output of any plant, that they cannot
determine what would be reasonable returns to charge for the services ren-
dered." J. A. Aylward, "Hearings and Comments on Wisconsin Legislative
Bills No. 518S and 933A."
is Ibid.
19 As illustrative of these tendencies were mentioned the primary nomination bills,
the demand for popular election of senators, and the growing use of the refer-
endum. Ibid.
20 In 1931 the name was changed to Public Service Commission. In 1931 a law
was passed giving to this Commission the power to obtain its expense involved
in investigation or service from the particular public utility concerned. Sec.
196.85, Wis. Stats.
21 These arguments were elaborated in a sixty-eight page mimeographed report
to the Wisconsin legislature, entitled "State versus Local Regulation of Public
Utilities," by the Railroad Commission.
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ation. Therefore, it is necessary to have a central body not only provid-
ing a uniform scientific accounting system, but a body having the power
to enforce a proper accounting. Furthermore, the question as to wheth-
er the operating expenses of a certain utility are reasonable or not can-
not be answered by an examination of a scientific report, but by com-
parison with the records of other utilities. This comparison is made
possible only through the instrumentality of a central body."
2. Local control would result in excessive cost for the necessary
information and for a competent staff. The necessary information is
relatively easy to obtain and to tabulate; but for the task to be assumed
by each local body would require an immense amount of time accom-
panied by a prohibitive cost to most of the local communities. Even
after the information had been obtained it would be to a large degree
valueless owning to the lack of uniformity in accounting systems. With
respect to the maintenance of a proper staff of experts in engineering,
accounting, statistics and other fields with their mechanical and scien-
tific equipment, even the largest cities would find the cost burdensome,
while for the others it would be financially impossible. 23
3. Local control is dominated too much by local influences and
demands. A demand for a decrease in rates may be made by a com-
munity for no other reason than that another community is enjoying
lower rates. There are many factors, however, that make for a differ-
ence of rates which a central controlling body is better able to discover
and evaluate. Among these factors are the price of coal, plant location,
the character and adequacy of the service rendered, the relation be-
tween demand and consumption, and the degree of saturation of the
business. Furthermore, local control cannot be freed from bias. As a
judge is not competent to act in a case in which he finds himself a
party, so a common council or a local commission is rendered incom-
petent to deal justly with the demands made by the public, which is
so directly represented.
24
4. Local control is illogical and impracticable owing to the fact that
many utility operations are statewide in character. What would prob-
ably happen regarding the rates of a telephone company which serves
not only a city but the surrounding community? Of course the rural
subscribers should not be discriminated against, but discrimination
would probably result owing to the weak bargaining power of the lat-
ter. Some other matters such as the physical connection of telephone
lines and toll service could not be handled at all by local regulating
bodies. The same general principles apply to other services. A single
electric company, for example, supplies current to numerous cities,
villages, and rural districts. How could anything except confusion and
bitter disputes come from an attempted regulation of this company by
each of the communities which it serves ?25
22 Pages 15-18.
23 Pages 19-22.
24Pages 23-25.
25 Pages 26-42.
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5. Local regulation of rates would lead to an unnecessary dupli-
cation of expense owing to the fact that state valuations must be made
anyway for the purpose of regulating security issues. There is no ques-
tion regarding the necessity for security regulation. Over-capitalization
with its consequent heavy fixed charges leads to an impairment of serv-
ice and a destruction of credit which is necessary for additions and
betterments. Security regulation is legally a function of the state, as
corporations are creatures of the state; but without legal obstacles,
piece by piece regulation by local bodies is very evidently an absolute
impossibility.26
Owing to the experimental nature of the new legislation, it was de-
cided to place some control in the hands of the municipalities, a con-
trol, quite naturally, that was not extensively exercised. Referring to
the situation in 1907, Lewis E. Gettle says:
"At that time there were certain misgivings and apprehensions of mu-
nicipal governing bodies relative to the surrender of the municipal reg-
ulatory authority to the centralized commission. The fact was evidenced
by the inclusion in the original utility law of section 196.58 wherein it
is provided in brief that every municipal council shall have the power
to determine by contract, ordinance or otherwise, the quality and char-
acter of each kind and product of service to be rendered within the
municipality, and all other terms and conditions not inconsistent with
the general powers conferred upon the Commission. It is further pro-
vided that the municipal council might require any public utility, by
ordinance or otherwise, to make additions to, and extensions of, the
physical plant, such as it deemed to be reasonably necessary in the in-
terest of public demands, and these provisions were so reserved not-
withstanding the provisions of the prior sections relative to the broad
and inclusive jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission over the same
subjects. * * * "In a few years, as was to be expected, municipal coun-
cils very generally discontinued and abandoned all attempts to exercise
such reserved rights and functions." 2
7
III
The granting of a limited monopoly, which was one of the funda-
mental purposes of the law, was effectuated by the employment of the
indeterminate permit.
Reference was made above to one of the main purposes of the
law as being the elimination of economic waste by avoiding duplica-
tion. This legislative purpose was supported both by the courts and the
26 Pages 43-45.
27 "Commission Regulation of Municipally Owned Utilities," pp. 3-4. This addi-
tion was made to the law by section 3 in 1931: "The commission shall have
original and concurrent jurisdiction with the municipalities to require exten-
sions of service and to regulate service of public utilities. Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed as limiting the power of the commission to act on its
own motion to require extensions of service and to regulate the service of pub-
lic utilities." Sec. 183.03, Wis. Stats.
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commission. In a leading Wisconsin decision 28 the benefits of monopoly
were referred to as the "elimination of excessive investments and ex-
cessive expenses caused by two or more public utilities, each with its
separate property and fixed charges, where the need of the consumers
only required one, and elimination of the risk to investors by encroach-
ments, or threatened encroachments, upon an occupied field of public
service without any public necessity therefor." 29 On another occasion
the court in pointing out the ills of competition stated that the final re-
sult was either consolidation or an agreement concerning the rates to
be charged, but that the consumer must bear the burden of the dupli-
cated plants in the prevailing ratesA0
The doctrine of competition for effective public utility control was
also condemned by John H. Roemer, a member of the Railroad Com-
mission, who said: "Potential competition has ever been a futile and
ineffective means of enforcing either the common law or the contrac-
tual obligations which public service corporations owe the public in
respect to charges and services." 31 He went on to state that actual com-
petition has always been of short duration and has without fail resulted
in economic waste, thus burdening the public with unnecessary expense
and bringing financial catastrophe to those investing in the securities
of such competitive corporations.3 2
The device used to provide for a limited monopoly was called in the
Wisconsin law an indeterminate permit. The monopoly granted was not
the kind that of old had an evil repute, but the "one purchased by giv-
ing an equivalent to the public, as in the case of a patent allowed by
the federal government."3 3 The limitation consisted in regulation by
28 Calumet Service Co. v. Chilton, 148 Wis. 334, 135 N.W. 131 (1912).
28 Page 365.
30 Wisconsin Traction, L. H. & P. Co., v. Menasha, 157 Wis. 1, 145 N.W. 231
(1914). "In either event (consolidation or agreement)," says the court, "the
rates were usually adjusted so as to cover fixed charges and to yield a return
on the cost of constructing the competing plants . . . " Page 8. (Italics ours.)
31 "Certain Important Provisions of the Public Utilities Law of Wisconsin," p. 3.
32 This matter has been discussed at some length owing to the fact that the doc-
trine of monopoly has been challenged, at least so far as the production of
electricity is concerned, by the Interim Committee on Water and Electric Pow-
er, appointed by the Legislature of 1927 by joint Resolution No. 54. Admitting
that the aggregate cost of competing plants would be greater, the Committee
attempts to prove that this "is but a very small matter compared to the enor-
mous saving that has resulted in cities throughout the country in the lower
rate secured by means of establishing competing plants." See Report, August
30, 1929, p. 67.
3 Calumet Service Co. v. Chilton, 148 Wis. 334, 359, 135 N.W. 131 (1912).
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the commission,34 which might even allow under certain conditions
either municipal or other competition. 35 But in any event the munici-
pality could in case of dissatisfaction terminate the permit by actual
purchase of the utility.36 It apparently was the intent of the framers
of the law that regulated monopoly should be the rule, with municipal
ownership an easy method in case regulated monopoly was not work-
able or failed to give consistent satisfaction, although there is opinion
that the use of the indeterminate permit was to "smooth the way for
municipal purchase. '3 7 At any rate municipal ownership was a fact
before the enactment of the law of 1907, and regulation in itself could
have little bearing upon municipal attitudes so far as this point is con-
cerned.
IV
A monopoly having been established, the legislature sought to pre-
vent its abuse by (a) a control of service and rates, and (b) a termina-
tion in case its existence became undesirable.
As service standards are technical in their nature, the legislature
provided that "the commission shall ascertain and fix adequate and
serviceable standards for the measurement of quality, pressure, initial
voltage or other condition pertaining to the supply of the product or
service rendered by a public utility, and prescribe reasonable regula-
tions for examination and testing of such product or service and for
the measurement thereof." 3
As for rates, they have a relation to accounting, valuation and capi-
talization, all three of which are provided for in the law. A system of
accounting 9 put an end to many difficulties. In the first place, it brought
about a much closer inspection of the operating expenses of public
utilities, thus curbing tendencies tow'ard excessive expenditures.4 0 In
the second place, it ended the prevailing confusion which made im-
possible the determination of the exact cost of giving service, which is
3 Section 196.02, Wis. Stats.
3 Section 196.50, Wis. Stats.
36 See Chapter 197, Wis. Stats.
3 E. Orth Malott, "Forces Affecting Municipally Owned Electric Plants in Wis-
consin," p. 17.
It was the opinion of the majority, at least, of the Interim Legislative Com-
mittee authorized by the Legislature of 1927 that the "law was grounded upon
the conception that the utility business is a natural monopoly" and that mu-
nicipal ownership was a protection against abuse. See Report, p. 49.
38 Section 1797m-23, Wis. Stats. (old section number)
3 See section 1797m-9,'Wis. Stats.
40 "Extravagant salaries, excessive expenses for promoting new business, etc. are
not willingly included in the type of detailed operating expense exhibits re-
quired by the commission" where there is the probability that such an exhibit
will be reviewed by the banker, the stockholder. and the consumer." R. V.
Johnson, "Workings of Wisconsin Commission," Public Service, Vol. XII, No.
4, p. 129.
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the basic principle of an accounting system. 41 In many instances there
was a confusion of the cost of construction with the cost of operation,
or no distinction made between repairs and replacements, or no account
taken of depreciation. 42 There could consequently be no rational rate
system with such an existing cost confusion, for if all items of opera-
tion are not included, there is a resulting over-statement of net earn-
ings, while if improper items are included, there is an understatement
of net earnings. In the third place, a uniform system of accounting
makes possible a comparison of one utility with another, thus making
for greater general efficiency. 43
The importance of valuation should not be under-estimated. 4 4 While
the law very simply states that "the commission shall value all the
property of every public utility actually used and useful for the con-
venience of the public,"45 the question as to what constitutes valuation
has had an interesting answer in Wisconsin, but which in a discussion
of this character would lead us too far afield.
While there is now a general agreement as to the elements which
enter into the determination of value, the relative weight to be given
some of them presents a still unsolved problem." So much has been
written concerning the elements of valuation that only a brief reference
is necessary to show the development in Wisconsin. It was said in an
early decision of the Railroad Commission that certain elements consti-
tute evidence of what is a fair value, 47 enumerating them as the orig-
inal cost of construction new, the cost of reconstruction new less de-
preciation, capitalization, and the gross and operating expenses. But in
making such an enumeration it must be made clear that the importance
of any one element depends upon the circumstances of each case.48
Furthermore, in getting at a just valuation there must be an elimination
of abnormal conditions,49 a recognition of the fact that plants are not
the product of one continuous building operation,5" and an appraise-
41 John H. Roemer, "Salient Features of the Regulation of Public Service Cor-
porations," p. 19.
42 .V. Johnson, "Workings of Wisconsin Commission," op. cit.
43 John H. Roemer, op. cit., p. 19.
44 "Physical valuation is the basis of the Wisconsin law regulating public utili-
ties. Almost every part of the law is shaped with reference to this fundamental
principle. Given physical valuation as a starting point, the other features logi-
cally and necessarily follow." John R. Commons, "How Wisconsin Regulates
Her Public Utilities," American Review of Reviews, August, 1910.
45 Section 1797m-5, Stats. of 1911.
46 See infra, pp. 91, 92 et seq.
47 "The main question involved in the valuation of a utility for rate making pur-
poses is to find the fair value, or that value upon which the investors are en-
titled to reasonable returns and which is equitable as between the investors on
the one hand and the customers on the other." State Journal Printing Co. et al
v. Madison Gas and Electric Co., 4 W. R. C. R. 501, 535 (1910).
48 Hill et al v. Antigo Water Co., 3 W. R. C. R. 623, 631 (1908).
49 Ibid, p. 633.
50 Ibid, p. 634.
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ment of the ability of the utility to meet reasonable demands from con-
sumers.51 Going value, of course, is given recognition.52
Those matters which cannot be considered at all or which receive
very little recognition are franchise value,53 capitalized value,54 book
value,55 market value, 56 good will 57 and contract value. 58
The Wisconsin law59 very properly provides for the control of capi-
talization. Although arguments can be found against such control, they
are far from convincing."0 The points in favor of such regulation can
be summarized as follows: Over-capitalization makes the securities of
public service corporations less safe for investment purposes, presents
a temptation to pay dividends on an inflated basis, with less emphasis
on service and extensions, and has a bad moral effect upon stock-
holders, officers, and employes. 61
5" City of Neenah v. Wis. T. L. H. & P. Co., 7 W. R. C. R. 477, 480 (1911).
52 Ibid.
53 "The value of the franchise is itself based on the capacity of the company to
earn a profit." City of Appleton v. Appleton Water Works Co., 5 W. R. C. R.
215, 282 (1910).
54 "It is well known from experience that public utilities are mostly over-capital-
ized, and that the par value of their securities usually exceeds the actual invest-
ment in the property used and useful in connection with the services they ren-
der to the public." City of Milwaukee v. T. M. E. R. & L. Co., 10 W. R. C. R.
1, 84 (1912).
55 "Book value is important, but it is so much dependent upon the original cost,
and even on the cost of reproduction and other elements, that it is difficult to
draw any distinct line between them." State Journal Printing Co. v. Madison
Gas and Electric Co., 4 W. R. C. R. 501, 557 (1910).
56 "Market price ... is not a safe basis for rate fixing. It may be based on rates
that are too high and should be reduced." Hill et al. v. Antigo Water Co., 3
W. R. C. R. 623, 722 (1909).
5 "Good will is an attribute of competitive business only." Payne et al v. Wis.
Tel. Co., 4 W. R. C. R. 1, 60 (1909).
58 It was contended that the owners of a utility were entitled to a "contract"
value where water power had been substituted for steam. This was not sus-
tained. City of Rhinelander v. Rhinelander Lighting Co., 9 W. R. C. R. 406, 426
(1912).
59 Chapter 183, Laws of 1931.
60 The arguments advanced in opposition are that there is a tendency to restrict
new enterprises, that the control of valuation and the designation of standards
for rate-making purposes goes far enough, and, furthermore, that capitaliza-
tion must be fixed in advance of rates. See Halford Erickson, "Regulation of
Public Utilities," pp. 50-52. It has been stated, also, that capitalization is and
ought to be a matter or private management and policy. This was the position
of John H. Roemer in 1914 when he stated that to control capitalization was
to substitute the judgment of the state for that of the corporation. "Under the
circumstances," he went on to say, "errors of judgment and misconduct of
officials are attributable to the state, and should in all fairness bind it equally
with the corporation in dealing with those who have in good faith invested in
the authorized securities." He predicted that it might become embarrassing to
the commission in its business of regulating service and rates, a prediction,
however, that has not been realized. See a pamphlet by him entitled "Certain
Salient Features of the Regulation of Public Service Corporations by State
Commissioners," p. 12.
61 Halford Erickson, "Regulation of Public Utilities," p. 42.
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This law, known as the Stock and Bond Law, was enacted by the
legislature of 1907. It has been subjected to several changes, some im-
portant ones having been made in 1931. Among the modifications and
additions are the following: The old law set out the purposes for which
securities might be issued, while the new one shifts the judgment as to
the reasonableness of the purpose to the commission ;62 under the old
law 63 bonds must bear a reasonable proportion to stock, while under
the new 64 it is proposed that securities shall bear a reasonable propor-
tion to each other, thus giving a control over preferred stock issues and
compelling a sufficient common stock equity; and under the old law6 5
funds must be identified or tagged, no public service corporation being
allowed, according to a literal construction, to issue securities for the
purpose of paying short term debts- which were not properly chargeable
to capital account, while under the new, control is given to the com-
mission, the corporation being required to state the purpose of issuance
"in such detail as the commission may deem necessary."
6
There are two important additions. It is provided that the commis-
sion may attach conditions to the issuance of securities.6 7 For example,
a bond issue may be coupled with the requirement that there must be
an additional issue of common stock. As a further protection to the
owners of senior securities, a corporation may be prevented from pay-
ing dividends on its common stock to the impairment of its capital.68
The old law prohibited the payment of a stock dividend, for which
prohibition no sound reason could be advanced. Section 184.14, which
covered this matter, was repealed.
A comparison of the law of 1907 and the law of 1931 reveals that
apart from the legislative determination of certain matters which arose
out of the wording and interpretation of the original law, the most sig-
nificant changes have had to do with the prohibition on the impairment
of capital and the control of the proportion of all classes of securities.
The second method of preventing the abuse of monopoly, as has
been indicated, is a provision, under certain circumstances, for its ter-
mination. The law provides that it may be terminated by municipal
purchase or by municipal or other competition.
The law of 1907, supplemented by the law of 1911, really created
three classes of utilities so far as franchises are concerned. Of those
already in existence there were some that surrendered their franchises
for the indeterminate permit and some that did not surrender; and,
62 Section 184.05, Wis. Stats.
63 Section 184.08, Wis. Stats.
64 Section 184.05 (4), Wis. Stats.
65 Section 184.06, Wis. Stats.
66 Section 184.06 (1), Wis. Stats.
67 Section 184.06 (2), Wis. Stats.
6s Section 184.11, Wis. Stats.
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in addition, there were those receiving their permits after the law went
into effect. Those surrendering their franchises consented thereby to
a purchase by the municipality in which a major part of the utility is
situated, waiving the right of requiring the necessity for the purchase
to be established by a jury.69 Those receiving their permits after the
law went into effect by the act of acceptance waived the right.10 As
there were those that did not surrender their franchises voluntarily,7 1
the legislature provided in 1911 that all franchises should be indetermi-
nate, but as to these the constitution of the state had application,7 2
which prohibited municipal corporations from taking private property
for public use without the consent of the owner unless a jury estab-
lished the necessity thereof.73
A municipality may compete with an existing utility, but only after
securing from the commission a declaration, following a public hearing
of all parties interested, that public convenience and necessity require
such municipal public utility.74
Competition by another utility, other than municipal, is allowed, but
only on the same terms that the municipality itself may compete.75
V
The control of rates and service has been impaired by (a) the de-
cision of the courts, and (b) the growth of holding companies.
It was the holding of the supreme court of Wisconsin in 1923 that
the prudent investment principle should receive more weight than the
cost of reproduction, the statement being made that "justice as well as
sound economic practice requires that controlling weight should be
given in the valuation of a plant of a public utility to the investment
cost where the investment has been prudently made."7 6 (Italics ours.)
69 Chapter 499, Laws of 1907; Section 1797m-71.
70 "It seems to us that the acceptance of an indeterminate permit by a public
utility amounts to this: that a verdict of necessity is thereby perpetually waived
and the utility consents that its property may be acquired in the particular
manner prescribed by the act." Connell v. Kaukauna, 164 Wis. 471, 487, 160
N.W. 1035 (1917).
71 For the franchises already in existence there might be a surrender if made be-
fore their expiration and prior to July 1, 1908 (section 1797m-77). This time
was subsequently extended to January 1, 1911 (chapter 180, Laws of 1909), but
in that year the legislature changed all unsurrendered franchises into indeter-
minate permits (chapter 586). Up to 1911 only ten per cent. of the public utili-
ties had surrendered their franchises, the principal reasons being that either
the franchises had been hypothecated to secure existing bond issues, or a
wrong idea existed as to the value of the franchise. See John H. Roemer,
"Some Features of State Regulation of Public Utilities," 1907, p. 23.
72 Article XI, Section 2.
73 Section 197.03, Wis. Stats.
74 Section 196.50 (4), Wis. Stats.
75 Section 196.50 (1), Wis. Stats.
76 Waukesha Gas and Electric Co. v. Railroad Comnission, 181 Wis. 281, 302,
194 N.W. 846 (1923). For a number of years the commission and the court
adhered to the prudent investment principle with "reasonable fidelity." See page
301. See also Hill v. Antigo Water Co., 3 W. R. C. R. 623 (1908).
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This decision, made at a time of rising prices, met with popular ap-
proval, as municipal purchase of utilities was made less difficult, specu-
lative activities based upon mounting values were curbed, and consum-
ers had some assurance that rates would not be inordinately increased.
However, the court took a different view four years later, owing
to the intervening decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Company.77 In the well-known case
of Smyth v. Ames 5 the Supreme Court of the United States set out
a number of factors to be employed in determining the fair value of
the property used for the convenience of the public, stating that they
"are all matters for consideration and are to be given such weight as
may be just and right in each case."'7 9 The McCardle case then used
this language at a time of rapidly rising prices,-language which quite
logically followed from the refusal of the court in the earlier case to
take either of the extreme positions:
"It is well established that values of utility properties fluctuate and that
owners must bear the decline and are entitled to the increase. The de-
cision of this court in Smyth v. Ames * * * declares that to ascertain
value 'the present as compared with the original cost of construction'
are, among other things, matters for consideration. But this does not
mean that the original cost or the present cost or some figure arbitrarily
chosen between these two is to be taken as the measure. The weight to
be given to such cost figures and other items or classes of evidence is
to be determined in the light of the facts of the case in hand."' 0
The supreme court of Wisconsin in following this opinion,-an
opinion that had "generously" ignored previous decisions,8 ' used this
language:
"In the McCardle case a valuation made substantially like that of the
commission in the present case was set aside by the court because, in
view of the great advance in prices during and after the war, it did
not correctly reflect the actual value of the property as of the time the
valuation is made, which is the date of the order fixing the rate and the
probable value for some years to come. A valuation which does not as
to the tangible property substantially reflect the then cost of reproduc-
tion less depreciation does not meet the requirements. * * * Where
there has been a period of rising prices for many years, the original
77272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316 (1926).
78 169 U. S. 466, 547, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898).
71 The court really took a compromise position regarding elements to be con-
sidered. In 1896 prices were very low. The railroads made the contention that
dividends should be based on the original investment, while William J. Bryan
contended for the state that profit should be based upon the reproduction value.
80 Page 410.
1 The McCardle case has been subjected to much criticism. See Donald R. Rich-
berg, "Value-By Judicial Fiat," 40 Har. Law Rev. 567 (1927) for an able
analysis and criticism of this case.
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cost plus cost of additions does not correctly measure the present
value."
8 2
The strong tone of this decision is apparently somewhat modified by
the language in Pabst Corporation v. Railroad Commission,s3 where it
is pointed out that as to the relative weight to be given prudent invest-
ment and cost of reproduction, there was no intention to withdraw
what had been said in the first Waukesha case any farther than was
necessary to conform to the federal rule; and that the requirement of
the federal rule is that "due consideration" be given to present-day
construction costs.
At any rate some weight is given to the cost of reproduction. As
prices continued to rise after these announcements by the federal and
state courts, there were some newly organized companies which sought
to take advantage of them to their financial benefit, although the older
companies were content to earn a return on their original valuations.
There were a great many dissatisfied individuals"4 in Wisconsin
who sought methods of evading the effect of these decisions. Two pos-
sible plans were suggested. One provides for a legislative adoption of
the prudent investment principle, while the other, far reaching in its
economic and governmental significance, seeks to set up a system of
municipal and state utility ownership and operation.8 5
The plan for the legislative adoption of the prudent investment
principle was advocated by Edward Bennet, Professor of Electrical
Engineering, University of Wisconsin. He said:
"It seems fairly clear that the problem in the agitation of the public
utilities is a problem which lies at the door of the legislature. Stating
this problem in general and yet in specific terms, it is the problem of
effectively embodying in the law, particularly in the stipulations relat-
ing to the granting of indeterminate permits, the statement that public
interest and necessity require the adoption of the principle that land,
structures and equipment purchased or acquired by a public utility for
the service of the public are thereby dedicated to the service of the
public and are held in trust for the public, and that a fair annual re-
turn to the investors in the utility shall be deemed to be such an annual
82 Waukesha Gas and Electric Co. v. Railroad Covvinission, 191 Wis. 565, 211
N.W. 760 (1927).
83 199 Wis. 536, 227 N.W. 18 (1929).
84 The dissatisfaction with the cost of reproduction theory has not only been ex-
pressed in Wisconsin, for which see the Report of the Interim Committee on
Water and Electric Power, 1929, page 47, but it has been quite general with
utility regulating bodies. See Note, 26 Mich. Law Rev. 89, 92 (1927), where it
is said: "It is . . . noteworthy that commissions, bodies which are much more
closely in contact with the problem and better fitted to solve it most intelli-
gently, stubbornly prefer the prudent investment theory in spite of repeated
reversals by the courts who are not so well acquainted with the situation."
83 See infra, p. 98 et seq.
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return on the money honestly and prudently invested as to command
all the capital needed in the enterprise."8 6
There would probably be no constitutional question involved so far
as utilities to be organized in the future are concerned, as the prudent
investment principle would become a part of the contract between the
state and the utility. There might be some question regarding utilities
already in existence, as the bill which he advocated8 7 provided that if a
utility has failed after two years to take steps toward the acceptance
of the principle, the commission may authorize competition." However,
in answer to the question as to whether this is undue pressure which
would render the law unconstitutional, it was said:
"Under the utilities law each existing public utility has been granted
an indeterminate permit which confers upon the utility an exclusive,
or monopolistic, right to serve its territory as long as it continues to
meet the standards of the legislature, as these standards may from time
to time be set by its agent, the commission. But let it be recalled that
this utilities law stipulates that by the very acceptance of its indetermi-
nate permit, the utility has given its perpetual consent to the purchase
of its property at any time by the municipality in which the major part
of it is situated,-the purchase price and the terms to be fixed by the
commission. * * * It seems improbable that a statute which brings
existing utilities under the uniform standards adopted by the legisla-
ture, crediting the owners with the values at which they have consented
to the purchase of the properties, will be declared unconstitutional on
the ground of undue pressure."8 8
In view of the fact that commodity and labor prices have declined
to such extent that the cost of reproduction may in many cases be less
than the original prudent investment, it is quite probable that agitation
for the legislative adoption of the prudent investment principle will
entirely disappear so far as the public is concerned.8 9
Another impairment of the control of rates and service has come
through the holding company. Most of the operating electric utilities of
Wisconsin are subject to the domination and ownership of three large
holding companies. That this situation has given rise to certain prob-
lems has been pointed out by a noted authority on public utilities:
"While it is true that in rate cases the utilities are always maintaining
the position that everything pertinent to the issues of the case is shown
86 "The Inadequacy of the Public Utilities Law of Wisconsin," The University
of Wisconsin Studies in Electrical Engineering, 1930.
87 Bill 715A, 1931.
B8 Brief Relative to Bill 715A, 1931, by Edward Bennett, p. 19.
89 Jay Morrison, president of the savings division of the American Bankers' As-
sociation, in 1932 predicted a probable thirty per cent. reduction in utility rates
on present reproduction valuations, and with falling prices the utility coin-
panies would probably return to their original contention that original cost
should be the basis for rate making. The Chicago Tribune, Part 2, p. 5, Janu-
ary 31, 1932.
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on the operating company books and records and that the holding com-
pany is merely the stockholder into whose private affairs the state has
no business to inquire, this claim is technical and theoretical. In fact,
the holding company often performs many of the functions of opera-
tion and, particularly, the holding company controls the financing of
the utility so that there can be no free consideration and adjustment
of the uitlity's affairs without the commission having actual and com-
plete jurisdiction over the holding, as well as the operating company.
This is quite impossible where the holding company is a foreign corpo-
ration and is practically impossible because of the magnitude and com-
plexity of its operations wherever the holding company or the manage-
ment corporation is a concern located in one of the financial centers
and having control over utilities scattered everywhere."9
The Interim Committee of the Legislature of 1927 likewise decried
the control of the holding companies and stated that "the municipalities
of the state are more and more losing control of the capital account
and financial structure of the electric light and power industry and,
as they lose that control, they lose control over rates, service, and the
possibility of purchase upon any sort of reasonable basis."91
While the suggestion has been made that it may be necessary to
outlaw holding company activities as conspiracies to interfere with pub-
lic regulation of public business,9 2 no such drastic legislation has as yet
been contemplated by the legislature of Wisconsin. 3
The Legislature of 1931 did, however, take action9 4 to control the
contracts or arrangements between operating and holding companies,
the latter being included in the broad expression, "affiliated interests."9' 5
Contracts or arrangements between public utilities and affiliated in-
terests must receive the written approval of the commission, but there
can be no approval unless the contract or arrangement is reasonable
and consistent with the public interest. Satisfactory proof must be
submitted to the commission of the cost to the affiliated interest of
the service rendered or the property furnished.9 6
90 Delos F. Wilcox, "The Indeterminate Permit and Its Relation to Home Rule
and Municipal Ownership," p. 70.
91 See Report, p. 96.
92 This suggestion was made by Donald R. Richberg, "Critical Issues in Public
Utility Regulation," The Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, Vol.
VI, No. 1, February 1930, pp. 8-9.
93 That holding companies can perform a useful service is brought out by the
Wisconsin commission: " . . . there are considerations of uniformity and
standardization which are important in relation to the development of a uni-
versal telephone service and which could hardly be met by the subsidiaries
of the American company acting independently..." Bogart v. Wisconsin
Telephone Co., 17 W. R. C. R. 524, 551 (1916).
94 Chapter 183, Laws of 1931.
95 Those owning five per cent or more of voting securities, or having one or
more common directors, or exercising a "substantial influence" over policies,
or having a connection through blood relationship are thus defined.
96 Chapter 183, Laws of 1931.
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The commission is given continuing supervisory control over con-
tracts and arrangements, and the fact that entry into contracts has been
approved will not preclude disallowance of payment thereunder if ex-
perience shows that payments made or provided for were or are un-
reasonable; and all orders of approval by the commission shall be con-
ditioned upon the reserved power of the commission to amend the
terms of such contracts.9 7
In order that this regulation may be made effective, the commission
has been given power of immediate enforcement. If payments are
made on contracts that have not been approved, or if payments are
made after being disallowed, the commission has power to issue a
summary order directing the public utility to cease, with authority in
the circuit court of Dane county to enforce the order, including the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.98
VI
It having appeared that the termination of the monopoly given to
the public utilities has become illusive because of (a) the limitations on
municipal indebtedness99 and because of (b) the practical prohibition
on competing utilities, the legislature has considered measures of recti-
fication.
The constitution of Wisconsin limits the indebtedness of govern-
mental units to five per cent of the value of their taxable property. As
this limitation has been approached because of increasing expenses for
schools and other municipal improvements, it has become impossible
from a financial point of view for a municipality to acquire existing
utilities. In order to remedy this situation, a joint resolution was passed
in 1929100 and again in 1931101 excepting indebtedness created for the
purpose of purchasing or constructing a public utility or any other in-
come-producing property, the indebtedness to be secured solely by such
property and not to be a general obligation. The question voted on in
November, 1932, was as follows: "Shall Section 3 of Article XI of
97 Section 196.52 (5), Wis. Stats.
98 Section 196.52 (7), Wis. Stats.
99 Utilities may be acquired by the creation of an indebtedness which has no
reference to the constitutional limitation. This is provided for in Chapter 595,
Laws of 1919. By virtue of this act a municipality may issue what are popu-
larly called revenue bonds, which are a lien on the property acquired, but which
are payable only out of the revenues from the specific property. The law was
held constitutional in State ex rel. Morgan v. Portage, 174 Wis. 588, 184 N.W.
376 (1921), there being, according to the court, no legislative attempt to create
corporate municipal indebtedness. This method of financing, however, presents
two major difficulties. One has to do with the disposal of the bonds. See
Report of the Street Railway and Electric Power Co-mmittee, Milwaukee, July,
1921, p. 82. Another difficulty grows out of the court decision, viz., that the
indebtedness for improvements is subject to the constitutional limitation.
100 61A.
101 14A.
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the constitution be amended to allow municipalities to finance public
utilities by'mortgaging the utility or its income instead of incurring a
general indebtedness to be paid from taxes?" The voters answered,
"Yes."
In the second place, competition with existing utilities as a means
of control is subject to the decision of the public service commission,
which must be convinced after a public hearing that convenience and
necessity require such competing utility. 02 As it is the theory of the
law as interpreted by the courts that competition is wasteful, competi-
tion is to be allowed only in extraordinary cases, and in fact, very lit-
tle competition has been allowed by the commission. The situation as
it exists in Wisconsin is presented by Delos F. Wilcox:
"The establishment of guaranteed monopoly * * * under the Wiscon-
sin law * * * prevents the municipality from itself establishing a
municipal plant and rendering service even for strictly municipal pur-
poses without first acquiring the existing utility plant, unless the mu-
nicipality is able to persuade the state commission that public conven-
ience and necessity require the establishment of a competing utility
plant. The effect of this corollary of the indeterminate permit is to put
the state squarely behind the policy of monopoly in utility operation
and to lay upon the municipality a heavy burden of proof to convince
the state commission that in a particular case an exception to the gen-
eral policy should be made. The commission's authority in the matter
being in the main discretionary, the municipality can make no effective
appeal from its decision.'10 3 (Italics ours.)
An attempt to remedy this situation was made in 1929 and in 1931
by a bill which would give to the municipalities the absolute right of
competition without offering proof to or securing from the commission
a declaration that convenience and necessity required the second util-
ity.' The bill was defeated, as were two substitute amendments. 10
One substitute amendment was intended to overcome the constitutional
objection that the franchise contract would be impaired by simply pro-
viding a rule of evidence for the guidance of the commission. The pro-
vision for a declaration from the commission that public convenience
and necessity required the competing utility, according to the proposal,
102 Concerning the commission's power to issue certificates of convenience and
necessity, the supreme court of Wisconsin, speaking through Justice Owen,
makes this significant statement: "The policy to be followed in the exercise of
the power is one very largely in the discretion of the commission, and in no
event will its orders or determinations in such matters be disturbed by the
courts, unless its exercise thereof transgresses the boundaries of reason ..."
Union Co-operative Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 206 Wis.
103 See the bulletin, "The Indeterminate Permit and Its Relation to Municipal
Ownership and Home Rule," p. 7.
14 Bill 10S, 1931.
105 Substitute Amendment No. 1S to 10S, 1931, was defeated by only one vote.
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would remain, but it would be modified by an additional provision that
the adoption of a resolution by the governing body of the municipality,
with the resolution approved by the voters, would be prima facie evi-
dence that convenience and necessity required the competitor. 10 6 The
other substitute amendment'0 7 provided that there could be no compe-
tition until notice of intention should be filed with the public service
commission, after which a duty is placed upon the commission to make
an investigation and submit a report.
VII
It is the legislative policy to make municipal and state ownership
and operation of electric utilities a real cure for the limitations that
have developed out of the original law.108
To the end that municipal and state operation might be a real alter-
native for private ownership and operation of electic utilities, the legis-
lature of 1931 made a provision looking toward a constitutional amend-
ment'09 for the recapture of water power and for state operation,
passed laws relating to power districts, and provided for the creation
of a state utility corporation. 10
A joint resolution to amend the constitution"' to provide for the
recapture of water powers, and permitting the state to enter into the
electric utility business, points out the object as follows: "
"For the purpose of promoting the wider use of light, heat, and power
in the home and on the farm, and for the purpose of encouraging the
industrial development of the state, the state may acquire by gift, pur-
chase, lease, license, or condemnation, and may own, convey, sell, as-
sign, lease, mortgage, construct, repair, and extend water powers,
plants, lands, equipment, materials, patents, rights, contracts, and fran-
chises, and all manner of real and personal property, used or useful
for or in connection with the production, generation, transmission, and
distribution of light, heat and power, and may produce, generate, trans-
mit, distribute, buy and sell light, heat, and power directly or indirect-
ly. S 
S2
106 Substitute Amendment 1S to 10S, 1931.107 Substitute Amendment 1S to 10A, 1931.
los This program has naturally brought considerable criticism. "The menace of
the large voting power that employes of the public could wield in elections
to retain existing administration is in itself . . . a sufficient argument against
municipal ownership to warrant opposition . . . Editorial, The Wisconsin
State Journal, March 16, 1931.
109 Section 10 of Article VIII of the constitution of Wisconsin provides that the
state shall never contract any debt for works of internal improvement or be
a party in carrying on such works.
110 This general program was outlined by Carl D. Thompson in 1928 in The
Municipality, the official publication of the League of Wisconsin Municipali-
ties. See "Essentials of a Constructive Program for Public Power Develop-
ment in Wisconsin," Vol. XXIII, July, 1928, p. 235.
111 By the addition of section 11 to Article VIII.
112 S. J. Resolutions, 10S, 1931: S. J. Resolution 46S, 1933, made certain changes.
Thus, another submission to the legislature of 1935 becomes necessary.
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In addition, the state is given power to finance these operations and to
provide for public corporations to carry out the purposes of the amend-
ment.
The power district law"113 provides for a new type of governmental
unit.1 4 The main reason for its creation is the fact that large scale pro-
duction and distribution of electric power has placed municipal opera-
tion at a disadvantage, though recent technological developments have
favored the smaller areas." 5 ''there is an additional reason for the cre-
ation of the district in that the new unit will have its own constitutional
debt limitation.
These power 'districts may be created by any two contiguous or
non-contiguous municipalities, with the restrictions that (a) no munici-
pality may be divided, and (b) that no municipality may be included
unless by a majority vote."16 Contiguous territory containing one or
more municipalities may be added upon terms fixed by the board of
directors and ratified by the electors in the municipalities to be an-
nexed.1 7 Districts may be consolidated by an ordinance which has been
passed by the board of directors of each power district and ratified by
the electors in each district.""
The method of creation is by referendum. The initiative for this
referendum may be begun in two ways: (a) By resolution on the part
of the governing bodies of one-half or more of the municipalities pro-
posed to be included in the district or (b) by a petition signed by ten
per cent or more of the electors in the proposed district. After the com-
mission has made a recommendation with reasons as to the feasibility
113 Chapter 50, Laws of 1931. G. C. Neff, in a Brief of the Wisconsin Utilities
Association presents arguments against such legislation. He points out that it
means another political subdivision calling for increased expenditures, that
the efficiency of service will decline after the substitution of political manage-
ment for private initiative, and that an "impelling reason" must exist for lib-
eralizing the constitution with respect to tax restrictions. See Report of the
Wisconsin Interim Legislative Coemiittee on Water and Electric Power, 1929,
pp. 256-258.
114 Power district laws are not new. California, for example, has had one for
several years.
15 "Up to the year 1926 the acquisition of municipal plants by large systems went
on at a rapid rate, but since that time, that is in the last five years, the facts
available indicate that instead of the inter-connected systems gaining ground
at the expense of the independent plant in most sections of the country the
contrary seems to be the case." This change is due, he points out, to techno-
logical development, efficiency of production on a small scale being due to the
modern Diesel engine and the improvement of the steam turbine. Thus, he
states, "the question can fairly be raised whether a comnntnity can be 'more
cheaply served with electricity by an inter-connected transmission system than
by an independent generating plant using the inwst efficient type of equip-
,nment." David E. Lillienthal, then-Commissioner, Public Service Commission
of Wisconsin, "Some Problems of Municipally Owned Utilities," The Munici-
pality, August, 1931.
116 Section 198.02, Wis. Stats.
17 Section 198.19, Wis. Stats.
"is Section 198.20, Wis. Stats.
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or non-feasibility of the proposed district, the referendum vote is
taken.""
The government of each power district is placed in the hands of
five directors with four-year terms. The directors shall appoint a gen-
eral manager and such other officers as they deem necessary. 20
The district not only has ample authority to conduct a utility busi-
ness, 121 but having existence as a governmental unit, it has the power
to tax.' 22 It is important to note in this connection that the utility prop-
erty is not exempted from taxation.' The justice of such a provision
is immediately apparent, as there would be a serious disadvantage to
certain taxpayers were the situation otherwise.
The capstone of state utility ownership and operation 124 is found in
the "State Utility Corporation of Wisconsin," 125 the control of which
is to be in the hands of five directors appointed by the governor. The
functions of this corporation, which give it no mean place in the
possible future power program of the state, are indicated by the law
as follows: (a) to encourage the public ownership and operation of
the electric utilities; (b) to develop a state-wide plan for unification
and integration of power facilities; (c) to furnish expert advice and
service to municipal utilities; (d) to survey the state resources and
facilities of power production; (e) to enter into contracts with private
utilities for the stabilization of their rate base; .(f) to provide for the
purchase and the fixing of a price of utility properties; and (g) to
furnish an organization for the construction and operation of plants
when the constitutional authority has been given.
SUMMARY
To summarize, the Public Utility Law of 1907 provides for a cen-
tralized control, with certain concessions to the municipalities. The
state granted to the utilities a limited territorial monopoly,-a mon-
opoly that could be terminated by purchase by the municipality or in
necessary cases by competition, but which during its existence could be
kept within bounds by giving the control of rates and service to a com-
119 Sections 198.03 and 198.04, Wis. Stats.120 Sections 198.07; 189.145; 198.16, Wis. Stats.
121 Section 198.14, Wis. Stats.
122 Section 198.10, Wis. Stats.
12Ibid.
124 "This measure represents the climax to Wisconsin's public power program.
During the immediate few years it is anticipated to function more or less in
an advisory capacity but when the constitutional authority is conferred upon
the state to actually maintain a publicly owned electric utility as in Ontario,
then the state utility corporation is designed to be the corporate entity which
operates the business." Alvin C. Reis, "Power Legislation in the State of Wis-
consin," Minnesota Municipalities, September, 1931, p. 347.
225 It is a state department as well as a corporation.
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mission. With a change in conditions-municipalities borrowing up to
their constitutional debt limits to provide for schools and other local
improvements-the phenomenal growth of great holding companies-
the scientific developments making possible the distribution of elec-
tricity over wide areas and the integration of small plants in divers
places, and with court decisions making municipal purchase more and
more difficult in a period of rising prices, it was the legislative decision
that the old controls needed more strengthening, and that municipal
ownership should be a real rather than a theoretical alternative for
state regulation. As a result, laws were provided for the close super-
vision of holding companies so far as their practices are concerned,
and for the creation of power districts in keeping with the demands of
scientific development; while the constitution would be amended to
provide for the expansion of municipal indebtedness in order to make
utility acquisitions financially possible, and to allow the state to enter
into the business of furnishing power in a gigantic program of indus-
trial development.
The political and economic center of gravity, so to speak, of the
utility business in Wisconsin is in the electric field; and it could be
only far-fetched reasoning that would fit the new state power program
into the theory of the old public utility law. The new idea is this sec-
tion of the utility development has no reference to regulation, for the
necessities of the future, it is thought, can be cared for only by gov-
ernmental participation. Thus spoke Philip F. LaFollette, at the time
governor of Wisconsin:
"In the civilization of the present, and promised for the future, the
supply of productive energy is a key factor. * * * The State of Wis-
consin lacks oil and coal; if it is to have a civilization balanced between
the city and the country, between the production of food and of manu-
factured goods, we must insure an intelligently directed supply of power
at the lowest possible cost. * * * "126 (Italics ours.)
In a titanic battle to maintain economic equality or superiority, the state
cannot regulate-it must command the resources and direct the activ-
ities for ultimate success. Again the former governor said: "It is urgent
that we create a * * * power program, the chief objective of which
should be to restore to the people of Wisconsin effective control of this
essential source of economic prosperity and social well-being, 12 7 so
that the State of Wisconsin "can successfully compete with the eco-
nomic life of any other State in America."'12
126 Philip F. La Follette, The United States Daily, May 6, 1931.
127 Message of Philip F. La Follette to the Legislature, Thursday, January 15,
1931, in pamphlet form, page 20.
128 Philip F. La Follette, The United States Daily, May 6, 1931.
